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Given President Bush's popularity among relatively poor rural residents and lack thereof among wealthier
urban dwellers in the 2004 presidential election, analysts have suggested that voters contradicted their
economic self-interests.  We investigate whether this conventional wisdom implied an absence of economic
voting.  Using exit poll data, we estimate whether a change in previous four-year financial status affected
the propensity to vote for Bush.  The main econometric concern is that underlying preferences for
Bush might dictate financial status change responses.  Beyond income and several other demographic
variables, therefore, the regressions hold constant indicators for state and congressional district, religious
affiliation, political philosophy and party, and Iraq war support.  Even further controlling for approval
of Bush's job performance, economic voting is statistically and quantitatively significant.  Effects are
asymmetric, with status worsening hurting Bush more than status improvement helped, and persist
even among subgroups that provided particularly strong or weak support for Bush.
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I.  Introduction 
  The conventional wisdom among political analysts following the 2004 presidential 
election was that the state of the economy played little role in the outcome.  Many other issues 
not directly related to voters’ economic well-being seemed to polarize supporters and detractors 
of President George W. Bush, with most of the latter group voting for Democratic candidate 
John Kerry.  Among other considerations, voters debated the ability of the candidates to provide 
direction for the war in Iraq that had been ongoing for over a year and a half, defend the country 
from further terrorist attacks in the wake of 9/11, and offer solutions to the possible insolvency 
of Medicare and Social Security as the earliest baby boom cohort approached retirement.  In 
addition, initiatives banning gay marriage were on the ballots of 11 states. 
This last factor likely contributed to “moral values” being the issue most frequently cited 
among 6,503 respondents to the 2004 National Election Pool exit poll as that most relevant for 
determining which candidate received their vote (National Election Pool, 2004).  One theory 
among commentators was that the decisive factor in Bush’s reelection was unexpectedly high 
participation among relatively poor rural residents who disproportionately voted for Bush as the 
candidate whose policies best reflected their own values.  In combination with opposing support 
of Kerry by many financially well-off urban residents, this suggests that many voters 
contradicted their economic self-interests, given that the candidates’ economic policies reflected 
the traditional relative favoritism of the financially better-off by Republicans. 
  These circumstances do not necessarily imply that economic conditions were irrelevant to 
Bush’s reelection.  The economy was named the most important voting determinant by 22.5% of 
the above exit poll respondents, ranking behind only the 23.3% who listed moral values and 
ahead of the 19.3% who chose terrorism and the 16.3% who selected Iraq.  In the 16 months   2
prior to the election, the seasonally adjusted national unemployment rate had declined from 6.3% 
to 5.4%, the lowest level since the month after 9/11.  The literature on economic voting, which 
shows that recent economic performance is a major predictor of whether incumbents (or their 
political parties) win presidential elections, implies that some voters might have given Bush 
credit for the economic upswing simply by virtue of it occurring during the latter stages of his 
term in office. 
  This paper investigates whether the anecdotal evidence that economic factors were 
counterintuitively related with voter choice translated to an absence of economic voting.  In a 
more widely distributed version of the exit poll referenced above, we capture economic voting 
using information regarding whether one’s family financial situation is better, worse, or about 
the same as four years ago.  This type of variable typically reflects “pocketbook” or “egocentric” 
voting (Campbell et al., 1960), a particular type of economic voting in which individuals focus 
on their own specific financial situation to evaluate the incumbent (or more generally his or her 
party).  We use this measure in lieu of proxies for regional or national economic conditions, 
which are relevant if voters are “sociotropic,” meaning that their evaluations of the incumbent 
are based on macroeconomic fluctuations (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979).  As a result, we do not 
distinguish between egocentric and sociotropic voting.  Furthermore, we cannot say whether 
voters, who may use past changes in their personal financial situation to forecast future changes, 
are retrospective or prospective, i.e. backward- or forward-looking (Downs, 1957).   
Our estimates of economic voting come from regressing an indicator of voting for Bush, 
as opposed to any other candidate, on an indicator for whether financial status improved over the 
last four years and another for whether it worsened.  The main econometric concern with using 
this egocentric voting type of explanatory variable is the inherent possibility of bias from   3
unobserved heterogeneity.  Specifically, Bush supporters might be more likely, ceteris paribus, to 
report economic improvements as an expression or rationalization of their support, while for 
reciprocal reasons Bush detractors might be more likely to report economic declines.  If voter 
preferences are in this manner correlated with reported economic welfare changes, estimates of 
economic voting will be overstated, so that econometric estimates will be disposed towards 
showing economic voting even in its absence. 
We empirically address this issue by including controls that are particularly likely to 
proxy for voter preferences and therefore absorb their spurious link with reported changes in 
economic well-being.  Beyond standard demographic characteristics, the regressions hold 
constant family income so that economic voting effects are identified from income changes 
rather than levels, which could be correlated with attitudes toward economic policies specific to 
the two major political parties.  Moreover, we control for political philosophy and party to 
account for opinions that determine voting decisions but are at least partially invariant to time 
and not specific to the candidates under consideration.  Also, estimates are conditional on an Iraq 
war approval rating, which further reflects fundamental political views that might contaminate 
economic status responses and constitutes an explicitly time-varying confounding factor. 
Most importantly, to directly yet parsimoniously account for underlying preferences that 
influence both votes and financial situation assessments, we enter into the regressions the rating 
that respondents assign to Bush’s job performance.  The occurrence of economic voting would 
imply that the change in a voter’s economic situation directly affects how the voter evaluates the 
success of the incumbent’s first term.  Inclusion of the Bush approval measure will hence absorb 
some of whatever economic voting effects do exist, rendering conservative the resulting   4
estimates of economic voting.  Indeed, the magnitudes of the economic voting coefficients fall 
considerably upon entering the job approval controls. 
However, even in the complete specification, economic voting is highly significant and 
quantitatively relevant.  Effects are asymmetric, with economic improvements helping Bush 
significantly less than declines hurt him.  Additionally, they persist even for subgroups that 
predominantly support Bush, including rural residents, the upper income, Christians, political 
conservatives, Republicans, and those who approve of Bush’s job performance. 
 
II.  Related Literature 
Economic voting is based on the idea that voters rely, at least in part, on past economic 
performance to evaluate the incumbent (or his/her party) relative to alternative candidates.  
Aggregate data support the notion that in presidential and congressional elections, the incumbent 
gets credit for good economic times but is blamed for bad ones (Kramer 1971, 1983; Fair 1978; 
Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Peltzman 1990; Eisenberg and Ketcham 2004; Leigh and Wolfers 
2006).  The positive effect of economic upswings on incumbent party vote shares, furthermore, 
is typically smaller in magnitude than the negative effect of economic downturns (Bloom and 
Price 1975, Claggett 1986). 
Individual survey data also suggest that voters reward incumbents or their parties for 
good economic times and punish them for bad ones.  Specifically, individual voting outcomes 
vary with indicators of recent changes in personal financial situation, after controlling for other 
explanatory factors (Fiorina, 1978, 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Kiewiet, 1981; Lewis-Beck, 
1988; Markus, 1988, 1992; Alvarez and Nagler, 1997; Gomez and Wilson, 2001; Nadeau and 
Lewis-Beck, 2001; Jordahl, 2006).  Personal financial situation improvement is typically   5
associated with voting for the incumbent, and vice versa, although the magnitude and statistical 
significance of this association varies across elections and countries.  Notably, voters tend to be 
more retrospective than prospective, particularly if an incumbent is on the ballot (Lanoue, 1994; 
Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001). 
To account for the possibility that latent preferences towards an incumbent candidate 
influence the voter’s assessment of recent personal financial situation changes, the above studies 
typically include the voter’s political ideology, party or both in their economic voting equations.  
However, our results suggest that these variables are unlikely to fully capture the spurious 
correlation between voter approval of a particular candidate and the voting choice.  We 
contribute to knowledge regarding economic voting by demonstrating that egocentric voting 
occurs in the 2004 presidential election even among voters who express the same degree of 
approval for President Bush’s job performance.  To our knowledge, only Fiorina (1981), in his 
analysis of presidential elections in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, implements an analogous 
strategy.  Fiorina (1981) also shows, though, that egocentric voting effects are not stable across 
elections.  Thus, the importance of economic voting, particularly of the egocentric variety, in the 
2004 presidential election had remained an open question in the existing literature. 
Studies of economic voting in survey data have typically imposed the condition of effect 
symmetry, i.e. that the beneficial impact on the incumbent vote share of improving financial 
conditions is equivalent in magnitude to the harmful impact of worsening conditions.  Only 
Fiorina (1978, 1981) appears to have allowed for asymmetric effects.  Yet, as mentioned above, 
several studies of aggregate data conclude that economic voting effects are asymmetric.  Since 
Fiorina (1978, 1981) finds that egocentric voting effects vary across elections, it is unclear a 
priori whether the 2004 presidential election will exhibit similar asymmetry.  In this respect, we   6
further contribute to the economic voting literature by allowing for the possibility that the 
negative impact on the likelihood that voters select Bush of diminishing financial resources is 
larger (or smaller) than the positive impact of increasing financial resources. 
 
III.  Data and Empirical Strategy 
We study economic voting in 2004 exit poll data from the National Election Pool 
(National Election Pool, 2004), a collaboration of ABC News, the Associated Press, CBS News, 
CNN, Fox News and NBC News.  Data for 50 states and the District of Columbia were collected 
through interviews conducted on Election Day, November 7, 2004, as voters left their polling 
places.  A probability sample of precincts within each state was selected to represent geographic 
and party-specific voting diversity; within each precinct, voters were chosen throughout the day 
at a rate that gave all voters the same chance of being interviewed.  From 22–31 October, 
telephone interviews were performed in 12 states with large populations of absentee and early 
voters (Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington) and in Oregon, where voting is done entirely by 
mail.  These samples were selected using random-digit dialing, with one individual selected at 
random within each household.  The Oregon sample was a dual design that also used registration 
lists in a way that ultimately represented every voter with a land-line telephone only once.  Our 
analysis sample consists of 58,740 observations, as further documented below. 
  The regression model used to estimate the impact of (egocentric) economic voting is 
   u worse fin better fin bush vote + + + + = 3 Xβ _ _ _ 2 1 0 β β β . 
Although this is a binary response model, we estimate it by OLS so that the marginal effects are 
easily interpretable.  Probit and logit models yield identical inferences and marginal effects that   7
are somewhat larger using mean explanatory variable values, as we subsequently show for the 
probit case.  We use sample weights and report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
The dependent variable, vote_bush, is an indicator of whether the respondent voted for 
President Bush.  Because anti-Bush economic voting might entail a vote for someone other than 
primary challenger John Kerry, the sample includes 825 respondents who voted for a candidate 
other than Bush or Kerry, although we later show that their omission does not alter the results.   
  The explanatory variables we use to test for economic voting are fin_better and 
fin_worse.  These are indicators constructed from the question, “Compared to four years ago, is 
your family's financial situation better today, worse today or about the same?”  Relative to the 
base group of voters whose economic status has remained unchanged during Bush’s first term, 
therefore, coefficients β1 and β2 measure, respectively, how much more likely respondents are to 
vote for Bush when their economic status has improved or worsened.  The economic voting 
hypothesis predicts β1 > 0 and β2 < 0, i.e. those faring better than four years ago will reward 
Bush with their votes while those faring worse will punish Bush by voting for another candidate. 
 The  vector  X contains many additional voting determinants, all of which are also binary 
indicators.  We begin by controlling for three plausibly exogenous demographic characteristics, 
gender, age and race.  Age is reported as being within one of nine groups: 18–24, 25–29, 30–39, 
40–44, 45–49, 50–59, 60–64, 65–74, or 75 and over.  Race is categorized as either white, black, 
Hispanic/Latino, Asian or other. 
Next, we hold constant two types of geographic variables in order to alleviate 
heterogeneity arising if living in areas that heavily support or reject Bush produces peer effects 
on voting behavior.  First, we add congressional district fixed effects, so that the economic 
voting coefficients are identified within congressional districts (which are themselves within   8
states).  All of the 435 U.S. congressional districts are sampled except for 27 of 53 in California, 
16 of 32 in Texas, 8 of 29 in New York, and one each in Georgia (of 13), Illinois (of 19), 
Maryland (of 8), Michigan (of 15), Ohio (of 18), and Washington (of 9).
1  The 4,677 participants 
interviewed by phone, including all Oregon residents, are grouped into state-specific residual 
categories because their congressional districts are unobserved.  Second, we include indicators 
for urbanization level, which varies considerably even within many congressional districts.  
Respondents are reported as living in cities with populations over 500,000, between 50,000 and 
500,000 or between 10,000 and 50,000, a rural area, or a suburb, with the latter defined as being 
within a metropolitan statistical area but outside the central city. 
The exit poll reports categorical information on when respondents made their voting 
decision.  We convert this into an indicator of whether voters had chosen the candidate for whom 
they voted within the last month or before that.  Inclusion of this variable is warranted if the 
behavior of relatively late deciders is more or less reflective of economic voting for reasons 
stemming from omitted correlates of the decision timing. 
  Even conditional on the factors listed thus far, and assuming there is no reverse causation 
running in the direction from the voting decision to reported financial situation change, the 
possibility remains that the economic voting estimates are biased by the opinions polled 
individuals have regarding the President.  In particular, individuals who voted for Bush might be 
disposed to report economic status improvements simply because they believe that the first term 
of his presidency was successful.  Conversely, voters who prefer Kerry or an alternative 
candidate might assess their economic status as having declined purely because they think Bush 
                                                 
1 Omitted districts tend to be components of multi-district urban areas, but some, particularly in California, New 
York and Texas, constitute rural areas.   9
was ineffective as president.  To address this more directly than do the controls already outlined, 
we include three additional sets of explanatory variables.  
One is income level, manifested by a set of indicators for eight categories of total family 
income in 2003: under $15,000, $15,000–29,999, $30,000–49,999, $50,000–74,999, $75,000–
99,999, $100,000–149,999, $150,000–199,999, and $200,000 or more.  Separately from the 
impact of a change in income, the level of income could be related to candidate preference.  
Specifically, because of his representatively Republican policies regarding taxes, business and 
other economic factors, individuals with higher income are expected, ceteris paribus, to favor 
Bush.  Economic voting coefficients are hence identified only within these narrow ranges of 
income, and level effects are largely netted out. 
  A second set of exit poll variables that more directly reflect candidate preferences is 
religious affiliation and political philosophy and party.  Religion choices are Protestant, Catholic, 
Mormon, other Christian, Jewish, Muslim, something else or none.  Respondents can also report 
whether they consider themselves liberal, moderate or conservative on most political matters, 
and whether they usually think of themselves as Democrat, Republican, Independent or 
something else.  One could imagine that being Christian, conservative or Republican reflects 
core ideals that make voters who possess them inclined to further support the candidate who 
shares these characteristics and ideals, i.e. Bush, by rating their financial situation as having 
improved during his term.  The opposite could just as well occur for voters with antithetical 
preferences.  Accounting for these traits is thus a straightforward way to address the type of 
omitted variable bias that concerns us. 
A limitation of these measures, though, is that they are largely time-invariant.  Religious 
affiliations are often transmitted within families from generation to generation, and recent   10
evidence suggests that even political beliefs are at least partially hard-wired cognitively (Amodio 
et al., 2007).  Particularly in the 2004 election, which took place in the wake of both an 
unprecedented terrorist attack on U.S. soil and an economic downturn that followed an unusually 
long period of record low unemployment, voters might have been susceptible to contradicting 
their traditional patterns.  Put differently, attitudes regarding particular candidates do not 
necessarily match those towards the philosophies they hold, and this sort of divergence seems 
even more prone to have occurred in 2004.  As evidence, nearly a fifth of respondents decided 
for whom to vote only within the preceding month, and 15 percent of poll respondents reported 
being Moderate and neither Republican nor Democrat.  
To address this deficiency, we include constructs of two variables that directly capture 
approval of the incumbent and a major event that occurred during his first term.  Specifically, 
survey participants were asked whether they strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat 
disapprove or strongly disapprove of the way Bush was handling his job as president and of the 
decision to go to war with Iraq.  In our most complete empirical specification, we include 
indicators for three of the four categories for approval of both the President and the Iraq war.  
We argue that, if anything, this specification provides a conservative estimate of the prevalence 
of economic voting, i.e. significance of the financial situation variables in this model constitutes 
strong evidence that economic voting took place in the 2004 election. 
The statement above contradicts the ambiguity inherent in our “kitchen-sink” style 
approach to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by directly entering into the regression 
proxies for specific omitted factors.  On the other hand, the Bush approval variable is the most 
direct measure possible of the exact unobservable that might cause problems for our estimates, 
loyalty (or disdain) towards the President that potentially influences the perceived change in   11
financial situation net of whatever change actually occurred.  Moreover, approval of the 
incumbent is presumably the intermediate variable through which at least some economic voting 
operates: voters financially worse off since the beginning of the current term are expected to vote 
against the incumbent precisely because their loss of welfare reflects poorly on presidential job 
performance.  Thus, the Bush approval variable almost certainly absorbs part of the causal 
component to economic voting. 
We concede that by its discrete nature, the Bush approval measure, though a 
parsimonious summarization of the heterogeneity that prospectively biases our estimates, might 
not fully reflect preferences that could impact financial situation change responses.  Offsetting 
this drawback is that it records both moderate and strong preferences towards Bush rather than 
simply reflecting endorsement or rejection.  Furthermore, inclusion of the Iraq war approval 
indicators provides a supplementary control for analogous preferences, given that the war, 
especially by the time of the election, was seen primarily as a reflection of Bush rather than his 
administration or Congress.  Beyond this, the Iraq, party, philosophy, and income variables 
could, albeit to a much lesser degree than the Bush approval variables, respond to perceived 
financial status changes and thus by their inclusion act to attenuate estimated economic voting 
effects.  In our view, therefore, a statistical link between becoming financially better or worse off 
in the last four years and the probability of voting for Bush in the specification containing all 
documented explanatory factors would provide convincing evidence of economic voting. 
  Appendix A lists all analysis variables, other than the congressional district indicators.  
The left two columns display row-specific sample means, calculated using sample weights.  
Column 1 shows the proportion of respondents satisfying the condition given in the row heading, 
while column 2 shows the proportion of such respondents who voted for President Bush.  The   12
full sample contains the 58,740 poll participants, out of 77,006 interviewed, that have complete 
information on all included variables.
2  Just over 51 percent of participants voted for Bush, and a 
slightly greater fraction reported being better off compared to four years ago than reported being 
worse off.  The sample is disproportionately female, prime working age, white, suburban, early-
deciders, middle-income and Christian.  Frequency of representation is substantially higher for 
conservatives than liberals, yet virtually equal for Republicans and Democrats. 
  Unconditionally, a pattern consistent with economic voting is readily apparent: while 
almost exactly fifty percent of voters with an unchanged financial situation opt for President 
Bush, four-fifths of those whose financial situation has improved but only one-sixth of those 
whose situation has worsened do so.  Beyond this, groups more likely to vote for Bush include 
males, whites, Christians, and those ages 30–74, not living in cities with population 50,000 or 
more, deciding before the last month, and with family incomes of at least $30,000.  As expected, 
most conservatives and Republicans voted for Bush while most liberals and Democrats did not.  
A majority of moderates and those who are neither Republican nor Democrat voted for a 
candidate other than Bush. 
  The proportion of voters who approved of Iraq and President Bush’s job performance is 
each 53 percent, although these groups are not perfectly overlapping.  Perhaps not surprisingly, 
whether or not one approves of Iraq or Bush is a much stronger predictor of the voting outcome 
than is the distinction between somewhat and strongly approving of either, and voting prevalence 
by Iraq approval category is quite similar to that by Bush approval category.  These facts suggest 
that Iraq approval is highly correlated with latent candidate preferences that prospectively induce 
                                                 
2 Information on financial situation changes is missing for 9,434 observations, i.e. over half of the 18,266 that are 
dropped.  Remaining omissions occur because of unreported information on, in order, the voting decision (611 
observations), gender, age, race or urban residence (1,515 observations), family income (4,018 observations), 
religion (773 observations), political philosophy or party (1,416 observations), Iraq war approval (309 observations) 
and Bush job approval (190 observations).   13
the spurious appearance of economic voting, and thus might serve as a proxy for such 
preferences that is reasonable but more exogenous than is Bush approval. 
 
IV.  Results 
Table 1 contains the main results of the analysis.  Each column reflects a separate 
sample-weighted regression of the binary “voted for Bush” measure on a constant and the sets of 
variables indicated in the lower panel.  Parentheses contain absolute values of heteroskedasticity-
adjusted t statistics.  The test of effect symmetry is simply the test for whether the two financial 
situation coefficients are equal in absolute value, i.e. the negative impact of being worse off after 
the Bush administration equals the positive impact of being better off, with each column showing 
the corresponding F statistic and p-value (in brackets). 
The right-hand side of the column 1 specification includes only the two financial 
situation indicators and thus echoes the analogous information from column 1 of appendix A.  
The unconditional economic voting effects are huge: compared to those experiencing no change 
in financial situation during the first term, a vote for Bush is 30.5 percentage points more likely 
among respondents whose financial situation improved and 32.4 points less likely among those 
whose situation worsened.  At the sample proportion of 51.1 percent who voted for Bush, this 
translates to semi-elasticities of 59.7% and 63.4%, respectively.  The standard errors are 
sufficiently small to not only produce extremely large t statistics, but also to reject at the 10 
percent level the hypothesis of coefficient symmetry, even though the absolute difference 
between them represents less than one-fifteenth of their magnitudes.  This rejection, given the 
relative coefficient sizes, implies that financial deterioration takes away from Bush support more 
than financial betterment adds to it, an implication we discuss further below.  By themselves, the   14
economic voting variables explain almost 25% of the sample voting variation.  The perception of 
having become economically better or worse off is thus a powerful predictor of how one voted.  
On the flip side, the magnitudes of the coefficients and t statistics seem much too large to 
reasonably reflect causal economic voting effects. 
  Column 2 adds to the right-hand side the indicators for gender, age and race.  These 
factors explain another five percent of the variation in voting and reduce the economic voting 
effects by 5–10%.  The resulting coefficients differ in magnitude by only .005 and symmetry is 
consequently no longer rejected.     
  Columns 3 and 4 insert geographic controls.  In column 3, holding constant the 
urbanization level indicators leaves the results virtually unchanged.  Notably, adding 
congressional district indicators in column 4, upon which economic voting effects are identified 
only within state-specific congressional districts, explains another four percent of the variation in 
voting but has little impact on the financial situation coefficients.  In heavily populated areas, a 
congressional district can be an individual county or even just part of a county.  Although we do 
not directly investigate the level of aggregation in economic fluctuations to which voting 
responds, therefore, this result is consistent with that from Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004) 
regarding national economic conditions being more relevant for economic voting than county-
level conditions.  Symmetry is again rejected at 10 percent, because the minimal ensuing 
reduction in economic voting effects is almost entirely restricted to that from being better off. 
  Estimates remain similar in columns 5 and 6.  For column 5 this simply means that voters 
who considered themselves better or worse off after President Bush’s first term did not make 
their decisions to support or reject Bush, respectively, systematically early or late.  The 
invariance of the coefficients to adding the family income indicators in column 6 is much more   15
striking.  It implies that the impact of changing economic circumstances on voting occurs 
entirely within narrowly-defined categories for income level.  Moreover, controlling for income 
level explains essentially no additional variation in voting outcomes, even before holding 
constant, in columns 7–12, the variables we suspect will most control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity that might create spurious evidence of economic voting.  As we show later, the 
situation is quite different when the financial situation and income indicators are entered in the 
reverse order: even in the fully saturated model, estimated income level effects depend very 
much on whether the financial situation indicators are included. 
  Columns 7–9 add, in inverse order of their expected impact on both the financial situation 
coefficients and the vote, the three factors that we interpret as essentially fixed proxies for 
political preferences.  In column 7, the religion indicators have a minor but perceptible impact, 
reducing the economic voting effects by 4–6% and explaining 2.5 percentage points of remaining 
voting variation.  The political philosophy indicators have a much larger impact in column 8, 
decreasing the coefficients by another 17–25% and accounting for an additional 10 points of the 
residual deviation in voting outcomes.  And in column 9, the effect of the political party 
indicators is even more substantial, as their inclusion brings about a further 30–40% drop in 
parameter size and raises R-squared by another 13 points.  All told, then, three groups that 
heavily support Bush, Christians, conservatives and Republicans, are liable to report financial 
situation improvements, while three factions on the other end of the political spectrum, non-
Christians, liberals and Democrats, are prone to perceive declines in their economic situations.  If 
first term economic policies directly benefited Bush supporters and hurt Bush detractors, 
inclusion of these political preference measures results in understatement of economic voting, 
because some of the effect of financial situation changes are falsely attributed to the preference   16
factors.  More likely, though, Bush loyalists simply tend to report economic improvements as a 
show of support or because they are more optimistic about the equivalent economic change, 
while the reverse is true for Bush critics.   
Importantly, however, economic voting effects, though diminished in magnitude, remain 
highly significant and large.  Becoming better off increases the probability of voting for Bush by 
23%, while becoming worse off lowers that probability by 32%.  In addition, the gap between 
the financial situation coefficients has risen to 4.1 points, i.e. one-third the size of the smaller 
coefficient and more than eight times the size of their standard errors.  Consequently, the 
coefficient symmetry hypothesis is now soundly rejected: Bush is punished considerably more 
by those doing worse since he took office than he is rewarded by those doing better. 
  The final step in table 1 is to enter the two strongest preference controls, the indicators of 
Iraq war and Bush job performance approval.  Columns 10 and 11 add each separately, without 
the other, and column 12 adds both.  Assuming minimal attenuation occurs as a result of 
economic voting directly impacting attitudes towards Iraq, the column 10 model, which includes 
Iraq approval but not Bush approval, might informally be thought to provide a conservative 
upper bound for the true economic voting effect.  The invasion of Iraq was clearly an important 
first term event that influenced the opinion many voters had towards Bush’s job performance, as 
evidenced by the categorical versions of the Iraq and Bush approval variables (i.e. categories 
numbered 1–4, with 1 = strong approval, etc.) having a sample correlation of 0.82.  However, 
views on Iraq seem sufficiently deep-seated to be largely outside the influence of personal 
financial gain or loss for most voters.  We interpret the column 10 estimate as only an “informal” 
upper bound because preferences regarding other first-term Bush administration issues (e.g. gay 
marriage, terrorism apart from its perceived relationship to Iraq) are not explicitly held constant.    17
Yet, one might simultaneously think of this upper bound as “conservative” because any of the 
political preference factors added in columns 7–10 could in principle respond to economic 
situation changes. 
Meanwhile, given the inherent collinearity of Bush approval with the decision whether or 
not to vote for Bush, as reflected in the regression of the vote indicator on only the Bush 
approval variables having an R-squared of 0.77 (not shown), we consider the estimate in column 
12, which controls for both Bush and Iraq approval, to be a strong test of the economic voting 
hypothesis.  Given that the Bush approval indicators are a flexible way to control for exactly the 
type of heterogeneity that could artificially inflate the estimated economic voting effects, yet 
seem likely to soak up some of the true economic voting effects, significance of the financial 
situation variables in the model controlling for these as well as the Iraq approval indicators 
would seem to represent convincing evidence that economic voting does indeed occur. 
  Indeed, the financial situation coefficients are larger in column 10 than 12, with those in 
column 11, which holds constant the indicators for Bush approval but not Iraq approval, having 
intermediate values.  The column 10 “upper bound” estimates, though substantially smaller than 
those in the initial columns, are still quite large.  Even conditional on political preferences and 
attitudes on Iraq war policy, financial improvements during Bush’s first term increase the 
likelihood of voting for Bush by 9.6%, while financial declines lower that likelihood by 17.2%.  
More importantly, our column 12 “lower bound” estimates, though somewhat diminished even 
from those in column 10, are still highly significant and quantitatively meaningful.  Adding to 
the above controls our “ultimate” heterogeneity proxy, the Bush approval indicators, an 
improved economic situation raises the propensity to vote for Bush by 3.5% while a worsened   18
situation lowers that propensity by 7.6%.  Once again, to us this signifies persuasive evidence of 
a causal economic voting effect. 
  One way to affirm the quantitative importance of the column 12 coefficients is to 
simulate the effect of a “reasonable” change in reported financial situation.  An ordered 
categorical version of the financial situation measure, with categories 1 = worse off, 2 = neither 
and 3 = better off, has a weighted standard deviation of 0.78.  Almost exactly one-third of the 
weighted sample perceived themselves as better off.  The supposition that 78% of the better off 
voters had instead responded that they were neither better nor worse off hence simulates a one-
third standard deviation change in this variable  In column 12, this minor modification translates 
to a reduction in the proportion of votes for Bush by 0.78 · 0.018 = 0.014.  Assuming from the 
analogous population figure that 98% of these votes went to Kerry, this would have shifted the 
overall popular vote to Kerry by a 49.7% to 49.3% margin.  The predicted vote shift would be 
even greater if we instead assumed some of the financial situation change involved more voters 
becoming worse off, used the column 10 or 11 estimates, or simulated a larger change. 
 The  column  12  R-squared means that the voting determinants for which we control 
account for more than four-fifths of the observed voting pattern.  The implication that little 
residual variation remains to be potentially explained by omitted correlates of financial situation 
change is encouraging for our desired causal interpretation of the economic voting estimates.  
However, as mentioned above, an auxiliary regression in which the Bush approval indicators are 
the only included right hand side variables yields an R-squared of 0.77.  Since the financial 
situation variables and, as we document shortly, many other factors subsequently enter the 
regression significantly but only explain another four percentage points of the variation in voting 
outcomes, presumably the scope persists for other voting determinants to do so as well.  Yet, in   19
an unreported regression in which the Bush and Iraq approval indicators are the only additional 
included variables, the coefficients of the financial situation indicators are 0.028 and –0.049, i.e. 
close to their column 12 values, and these are arguably already conservative because of reverse 
causation from financial situation to Bush approval. 
  The other result from columns 10–12 in table 1 is the very highly significant asymmetry 
in economic voting effects: the incumbent has much more to lose from voters perceiving a loss in 
economic welfare during his administration than he has to gain from the opposite.  Because Bush 
received just over one-half of the vote, this asymmetry persists when evaluated in terms of 
proportions voting for or against Bush.  This finding is consistent with the aforementioned 
conclusions from aggregate data that economic downturns hurt the incumbent party, but 
economic upswings do not help it (Bloom and Price 1975, Claggett 1986).  A plausible 
explanation is that economic voting implies expectations of improved personal financial 
situations; incumbents are not rewarded nearly as much for fulfilling those expectations as they 
are punished for not doing so.  Alternatively, voters may credit themselves for improvements in 
their financial situations, but blame the government when things go wrong.  Either way, factors 
in this specific election that might have augmented such behavior include the ideological nature 
of issues that seemed to be at the voting margin for many (including Iraq, terrorism and gay 
marriage) and that Bush’s approval ratings had been on a downward trajectory heading into the 
election.  Moreover, Amodio et al. (2007) find that liberals tend to exhibit behavior that is more 
flexible (or indecisive) than that of conservatives.  For all these reasons, Bush supporters might 
have been a relatively more rigid group in their political opinions than were his detractors. 
  Column 3 of Appendix A shows the full set of estimates from the regression of column 
12 in table 1.  These mostly reflect the relationships apparent from the earlier cross-tabulations.    20
Groups more likely to vote for Bush include respondents age 30 and above, compared to those 
age 18–24; whites, compared to blacks and Hispanics; those making their decision prior to the 
last month; Christians relative to the non-religious; and the non-religious relative to Muslims and 
Jews.  Even controlling for Iraq and Bush approval, voting propensities differ by 6–7 percent for 
liberals and conservatives compared to moderates and by 18–19 percent for Republicans and 
Democrats compared to others.  The voting difference between those who strongly approve and 
strongly disapprove of Iraq policy is comparable to that between Republicans and Democrats, 
with much smaller but still significant discrepancies between those who feel strongly and less 
strongly one way or the other.  The huge effects of Bush disapproval, even compared to those for 
political party and Iraq approval (and while controlling for those factors), reiterate the 
importance of job performance rating as a determinant of the vote and thus a control for 
unobserved heterogeneity.  Results that contradict those predicted by the summary statistics 
include males and residents of mid-sized cities being more likely to vote for Bush than females 
and residents of large cities, respectively. 
Column 4 of Appendix A mimics column 3, except that the right hand side excludes the 
two financial situation indicators that are the focus of the analysis.  We do this to highlight the 
effect on voting of family income, the only factor for which coefficients are notably different in 
columns 3 and 4.  In column 3, when financial situation change is held constant, the voting 
outcome is unrelated to family income.  None of the income indicators are significant at 10 
percent, and the F-statistic for their joint significance is 0.81 (p = 0.58).  However, with the 
financial situation indicators excluded in column 4, family income becomes an important voting 
determinant.  Voting for Bush is more likely by nearly three percent among respondents with 
family incomes of $50,000–149,000 and six percent among those with incomes above $150,000,   21
and the set of income indicators is jointly significant with an F-statistic of 3.29 (p = 0.002).  
Thus, the conventional wisdom that economic status did not affect voting behavior is true but 
misleading: income level did not matter conditional on the change in status, which very much 
did.  Column 4 is also misleading in the sense that column 3 shows it would be incorrect to 
conclude that voters made decisions based on the impact of policies that have income level-
specific effects, i.e. higher income voters favoring Bush because of lower income tax rates. 
  Finally, table 2 shows results for alternative specifications (panels A.– B.) and samples 
(panels C.–P.).  Columns 1–2 and 3–4 pertain to the specifications from columns 10 and 12, 
respectively, of table 1, with odd (even) numbered columns displaying estimates for becoming 
better (worse) off.  Panel A. shows that weighting the data does not drive the results other than to 
produce smaller coefficients for financial improvement, even though Bush actually received 
fewer votes than did Kerry in the unweighted sample.  In panel B., conclusions are unchanged 
when a probit model is used to account for the discrete nature of the dependent variable.  
However, probit marginal effects, evaluated at the explanatory variable means, are much larger 
than are those from OLS.  This is a function of the dependent variable mean being very close to 
0.5, so that small probit coefficient changes translate to large changes in probability, and 
provides another sense in which the OLS estimates that include the approval indicators are 
conservative.  Panel C. indicates that removing the 825 respondents who voted for a candidate 
other than Bush or Kerry makes no difference to the analysis. 
  Panels D.–P. list economic voting effects for stratified samples.  A theme that emerges is 
that doing better (worse) financially has little effect among voters that heavily (dis)favor Bush, in 
that effect sizes tend to be proportionate to the size of the group that might change its vote in 
response to economic situation changes.  For example, in column 1 of panel P., the effect of   22
becoming better off is only 0.008 among those who approve of Bush, but this represents a sizable 
fraction, i.e. 10%, of the few in that group who did not vote for Bush.  Overall, financial situation 
coefficients are always significant at the 5% level in columns 1 and 2, and are only occasionally 
insignificant at the 10% level in columns 3 and 4.  In this latter specification that holds constant 
Bush approval, when one of the two financial situation coefficients is not significant at 5%, the 
other is always highly significant.  This means that even controlling for Bush approval, economic 
voting effects persist even among groups that exhibit very strong or weak support for Bush. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
Our analysis has found what we view as strong evidence of economic voting in the 2004 
presidential election.  Holding constant attitudes towards President Bush and his Iraq war policy 
as well as political party and philosophy, religious affiliation, family income, congressional 
district and several additional personal characteristics, becoming financially better off during 
Bush’s first term raised the likelihood of voting for Bush by 3.5% while becoming worse off 
lowered that likelihood by 7.6%.  Simply omitting the controls for opinions on Bush’s job 
performance yields analogous effects of 9.6% and 17.2%, respectively.  These results hold up 
even among voters who strongly supported or rejected Bush.  Moreover, the harm to Bush from 
experiencing an economic decline was statistically larger than the benefit he enjoyed from an 
economic improvement.  We conclude that in spite of conventional wisdom to the contrary, 
economic voting, particularly of the egocentric variety, was still quite important. 
  A limitation of our study is that if our strategy indeed provides, as we believe, a strong 
test for economic voting, it might inherently not provide the most precise point estimates.  If 
becoming financially worse off prompted voters to both disapprove of Bush’s job performance   23
and vote against Bush, or vice versa for becoming better off, then the effect of economic voting 
is partially absorbed by the coefficients on the Bush approval indicators.  On the flip side, it is 
impossible to argue, without achieving an R-squared of unity, that our strategy eliminates the 
influence of all further potentially confounding factors.  Although many factors work in our 
favor, including the reverse causation issue above, it is not totally inconceivable that a voting 
determinant we cannot observe is correlated with reported financial situation change. 
  One question begged by our results is the extent to which the egocentric economic voting 
we have uncovered reflects responses to changes in local or national economic conditions.  As 
noted above, the invariance of the financial situation coefficients to the inclusion of 
congressional district indicators suggests that the effects captured by our analysis do not vary by 
localities.  Our data, though merely cross sectional, allow for a more direct test of the impact that 
economic conditions have on voting.  In particular, the percentage of state voters opting for Bush 
would seem to be a parsimonious proxy for state-level factors that might spuriously correlate 
state-level economic conditions and voting decisions.  Preliminary results from DeSimone and 
LaFountain (2007) show that larger increases in the state unemployment rate during Bush’s first 
term reduce the propensity to vote for Bush, and this effect is relatively robust to holding 
constant ecocentric economic voting of the type estimated here.   24
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Table 1: Economic voting effects (n = 58,740) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Financial situation 
















































































R-squared  .243 .292 .299 .338 .339 .341 .366 .467 .601 .716 .805 .813 
I n c l u d e s   i n d i c a t o r s   f o r :               
Gender,  age  and  race  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Urbanization  No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Congressional  district  No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Decided  in  last  month  No  No  No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Family  income  No  No  No  No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Religion  No No No No No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Political  philosophy  No No No No No No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Political  party  No No No No No No No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Iraq  approval  No No No No No No No No No Yes No Yes 
Bush  approval  No No No No No No No No No No Yes  Yes 
 
Coefficients are from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is an indicator of whether the respondent voted for Bush, and are relative to the omitted 
category “financial situation is about the same as four years ago.”  Parentheses contain absolute values of heteroskedasticity-adjusted t statistics.  F statistics for 
the hypothesis that the two financial situation coefficients are equal in absolute value are shown for tests of effect symmetry, with p-values given in brackets.  
Row headings reflect sets of indicator variables as listed in Appendix A.  27
Table 2: Economic voting effects in alternative specifications and samples 
 
  Bush approval included?  No  Yes 
  Financial  situation  is:  Better Worse Better Worse 
  Specification/sample  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Unweighted 









B.  Probit marginal effects 









C.  Voted for Bush or Kerry 





























E. Age  18–24 









 Age  25–44 









 Age  45–64 









 Age  65+ 





























G.  City with population 50,000+ 



















  Rural area or city with population < 50,000 

















































I.  States that Bush won 









  States that Kerry won 
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Table 2 (continued): Economic voting effects in alternative specifications and samples 
 
  Bush approval included?  No  Yes 
  Financial  situation  is:  Better Worse Better Worse 
  Specification/sample  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
J.  Decided prior to last month 









  Decided in last month 









K.  Family income less than $30,000 









  Family income $30,000–99,999 









  Family income $100,000 or more 









L.  Protestant or Catholic 









 Other  Christian 









 Other  religion 









 No  religion 



























































  Neither Democrat nor Republican 









O.  Approve of Iraq war 









  Disapprove of Iraq war 









P.  Approve of Bush’s handling of job 









  Disapprove of Bush’s handling of job 










Regressions have the specifications (panels A and B) or include only the subsamples (panels C through P) indicated 
in the row heading.  The models for columns 1–2 correspond to column 10 of table 1, while those for columns 3–4 
correspond to column 12 of table 1.  Parentheses contain absolute values of heteroskedasticity-adjusted t statistics.   29






OLS estimates: controls for 
financial situation change? 
     Yes  No 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Voted for Bush  .511       
Financial situation better than 4 years ago  .336  .804  .018 (5.7)   
Financial situation same as 4 years ago   .382  .499     
Financial situation worse than 4 years ago  .282  .175  –.039 (10.6)   
Female .525  .490     
Male  .475  .534  –.013 (5.1)  –.013 (4.9) 
Age 18–24  .100  .412     
Age 25–29  .087  .449  .003 (0.5)  .005 (0.8) 
Age 30–39  .190  .530  .022 (4.1)  .022 (4.2) 
Age 40–44  .117  .565  .026 (4.5)  .025 (4.3) 
Age 45–49  .118  .530  .022 (3.8)  .019 (3.3) 
Age 50–59  .190  .512  .029 (5.4)  .026 (4.8) 
Age 60–64  .078  .544  .036 (5.6)  .033 (5.2) 
Age 65–74  .081  .532  .032 (4.9)  .030 (4.6) 
Age 75 and over  .040  .470  .021 (2.7)  .022 (2.8) 
White .787  .579     
Black  .109  .131  –.047 (8.0)  –.048 (8.1) 
Hispanic  .069  .388  –.041 (5.7)  –.040 (5.7) 
Asian  .016  .365  –.019 (1.3)  –.020 (1.3) 
Other race  .020  .402  –.002 (0.2)  –.003 (0.3) 
City with population over 500,000   .107  .341     
City with population 50,000–500,000   .195  .475  –.017 (1.8)  –.020 (2.1) 
Suburb  .447  .523  .002 (0.3)  –.000 (0.0) 
City with population 10,000–49,999  .085  .582  –.006 (0.6)  –.009 (0.9) 
Rural area  .166  .592  –.002 (0.2)  –.004 (0.5) 
Decided before last month  .811  .529     
Decided within last month  .189  .432  –.027 (6.0)  –.028 (6.1) 
Family income less than $15,000  .075  .364     
Family income $15,000–29,999  .141  .428  .001 (0.2)  .004 (0.6) 
Family income $30,000–49,999  .221  .502  .002 (0.4)  .008 (1.3) 
Family income $50,000–74,999  .227  .551  .004 (0.7)  .013 (2.2) 
Family income $75,000–99,999  .143  .552  .002 (0.4)  .014 (2.3) 
Family income $100,000–149,999  .114  .540  –.000 (0.1)  .014 (2.1) 
Family income $150,000–199,999  .040  .568  .012 (1.5)  .028 (3.4) 
Family income $200,000 or more  .040  .604  .011 (1.4)  .029 (3.5)   30






OLS estimates: controls for 
financial situation change? 
     Yes  No 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Protestant  .319  .629  .013 (2.6)  .014 (2.6) 
Catholic  .256  .508  .008 (1.5)  .008 (1.4) 
Mormon  .020  .771  .036 (2.7)  .036 (2.7) 
Other Christian  .214  .533  .020 (3.7)  .020 (3.7) 
Jewish  .027  .211  –.018 (2.0)  –.018 (1.9) 
Muslim  .006  .121  –.042 (2.2)  –.042 (2.2) 
Other religion  .058  .269  –.003 (0.5)  –.003 (0.5) 
No religion  .100  .284     
Liberal  .206  .138  –.030 (7.9)  –.029 (7.5) 
Moderate .456  .440     
Conservative  .338  .833  .035 (10.1)  .036 (10.4) 
Democrat  .369  .119  –.096 (21.9)  –.098 (22.1) 
Republican  .376  .928  .090 (19.5)  .092 (20.1) 
Neither Democrat nor Republican  .255  .463     
Strongly approve war with Iraq  .294  .947     
Somewhat approve war with Iraq  .240  .762  –.029 (7.3)  –.032 (7.9) 
Somewhat disapprove war with Iraq  .156  .232  –.151 (19.7)  –.156 (20.3) 
Strongly disapprove war with Iraq  .310  .042  –.173 (21.9)  –.181 (22.7) 
Strongly approve Bush performance  .325  .964     
Somewhat approve Bush performance  .205  .852  –.017 (3.6)  –.021 (4.6) 
Somewhat disapprove Bush performance  .124  .154  –.535 (54.2)  –.546 (55.7) 
Strongly disapprove Bush performance  .346  .012  –.606 (65.1)  –.623 (67.9) 
Constant  1    .864 (72.8)  .865 (73.6) 
 
All variables are binary indicators.  Column 1 shows the proportion of respondents characterized by the row 
heading, column 2 shows the proportion characterized by the row heading that voted for Bush, and columns 3 and 4 
show coefficients and absolute values of heteroskedasticity-adjusted t statistics (in parentheses) from OLS 
regression of whether the respondent voted for Bush on the variables listed and congressional district fixed effects, 
with financial situation indicators excluded from the column 4 specification.  All parameters in the table were 
calculated using sample weights. 
 